An Avoidable Grounding in the Red Sea: GPS Spoofing and the MSC Antonia

On May 10, 2025, the container ship MSC Antonia ran aground near Eliza Shoals, just outside Jeddah Port in Saudi Arabia. The 304-metre Liberian-flagged vessel was enroute from Marsa Bashayer, Sudan, to Jeddah when it fell victim to a confirmed GPS spoofing attack – a growing threat in maritime navigation.

According to Captain Steve Bomgardner, Vice President of Shipping and Offshore at Pole Star Global, the vessel’s Automatic Identification System (AIS) was manipulated to display false positioning data. Deceived by these signals, the bridge crew believed they were on a safe course – until the ship veered dangerously off track and ran aground.

This incident highlights several critical vulnerabilities in modern maritime operations:

• Over-reliance on GNSS: Many commercial ships use Global Navigation Satellite Systems as their primary navigational tool, often without cross-checking against radar, visual bearings, or inertial navigation systems.

• Lack of spoofing detection: Current onboard systems may lack the ability to alert crews to spoofed satellite signals.

• Reduced situational awareness: In contested maritime regions, interpreting conflicting data becomes far more difficult – especially without clear signs of signal tampering.

As of May 23, the MSC Antonia remains grounded while salvage operations continue. Thankfully, no injuries have been reported.

This event serves as a reminder of the risks posed by electronic interference and the need for improved navigational redundancy and cybersecurity in today’s maritime industry.

Why Traditional Seamanship Still Matters

This incident reinforces a hard truth: technology can fail – seamanship must not. At Small Vessels Manual, we continue to uphold and teach paper chart navigation, manual plotting, and dead reckoning as core maritime skills. This isn’t just tradition – it’s preparedness.

In fact, AMSA (Australian Maritime Safety Authority) still requires competence in paper chart navigation for Certificates of Competency (CoC) in Australia.

These foundational skills are mission-critical during:

• Satellite signal disruptions

• Cyber interference

• Operations in geopolitical hotspots where electronic warfare may be active

These are not theoretical risks. In the early 1990s, while serving as an officer aboard the BP Achiever, I experienced firsthand GPS manipulation in the Arabian Gulf. During a crude oil run to BP's Kwinana refinery, satellite signals were deliberately distorted to protect coalition forces from Scud missile targeting. We relied on traditional methods to maintain situational awareness when technology failed.

We must never lose sight of these skills.

AIS Spoofing: A Threat to the Great Barrier Reef

The implications of GPS and AIS spoofing go beyond trade and safety – they pose a serious environmental risk. Along Australia’s northeast coast, from Torres Strait to the bottom of the Great Barrier Reef, ship traffic is managed by Queensland VTS (Vessel Traffic Service).

This system depends on AIS data to guide vessels safely through one of the most hazardous and ecologically sensitive regions in the world.

If AIS data is spoofed here, VTS operators and Ships could be misled – causing ships to stray into protected coral reef zones, risking:

• Groundings

• Oil spills

• Irreversible ecological damage to the UNESCO-listed Great Barrier Reef

This isn’t just a cyberattack – it’s a potential environmental catastrophe.

Strengthening Maritime Readiness

The MSC Antonia incident is a stark reminder that electronic manipulation, whether basic or advanced, can have serious consequences for global maritime safety and logistics.

Recommended actions moving forward:

• Ensure vessels are equipped with redundant navigation systems

• Conduct manual navigation drills regularly

• Update emergency preparedness plans to include cyber-disruption responses

• Collaborate with maritime cybersecurity experts

• Re-emphasise traditional navigation training for all officers of the watch

Captain Bomgardner noted that although the spoofing involved was not highly sophisticated, its disruptive impact was significant, highlighting how vulnerable modern shipping has become.

Watchkeeping Is More Than Watching Screens

Whether commanding a 7,000-TEU container ship or a 24-metre coastal freighter, one principle remains unchanged: The Officer of the Watch must be more than just a system monitor.

Watchkeeping is not passive. It demands:

• Situational awareness

• Critical thinking

• Manual navigation skills

• The courage to question automated systems when something feels wrong

Let the grounding of MSC Antonia be a call to action. Our oceans are changing – but so must our readiness.

Would love to know what the industry thinks – how vital are traditional analogue skills and are you seeing a decline in this readiness in the next generation? Leave a comment or reach out with your thoughts to info@smallvesselsmanual.com.

Capt. Cal

Sail Your Own Course

Author and Editor, Small Vessels Manual